recent deaths in lucedale, ms
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes. Choose File in the main menu and select Open Folder.\n3. Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data. Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. 
WebSearch PowerShell packages: SentinelOne 2.0.0. SentinelOne.psm1 The name you type is validated to make sure that it's unique in Azure Functions. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration). Detects user name "martinstevens". Distributed by an MIT license. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. 01 - Prod\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Env. WebSentinelOne Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is agent-based threat detection software that can address malware, exploits, and insider attacks on your network. Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names. SentinelOne API token limitations The API token is only available to view during token creation. By default, you will need to define your management consoles url. Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process. A URI or Endpoint This will be an HTTP or Reason why this event happened, according to the source. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain. Provide the following information at the prompts:\n\n\ta. If this information is lost before it is submitted to Arctic Wolf on the These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes. The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision, Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. ", "Group Default Group in Site CORP-workstations of Account CORP", "Global / CORP / CORP-workstations / Default Group", "{\"accountId\": \"551799238352448315\", \"activityType\": 5009, \"agentId\": \"841026328128144438\", \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-05T09:12:46.391928Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"corp\", \"computerName\": \"CL001234\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Group Default Group in Site corp-workstations of Account corp\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / corp / corp-workstations / Default Group\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"newGroupId\": \"551799242261539645\", \"newGroupName\": \"Default Group\", \"oldGroupId\": \"797501649544140679\", \"oldGroupName\": \"DSI\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteName\": \"corp-workstations\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": \"551799242261539645\", \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1391847623762392173\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The Agent CL001234 moved dynamically from Group DSI to Group Default Group\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"551799242253151036\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-05T09:12:45.472693Z\", \"userId\": null}", "The Agent CL001234 moved dynamically from Group DSI to Group Default Group", "Group Default Group in Site corp-workstations of Account corp", "Global / corp / corp-workstations / Default Group", "{\"accountId\": \"123456789831564686\", \"activityType\": 5126, \"agentId\": \"1098352279374896038\", \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-29T17:20:31.139698Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"bluetoothAddress\": \"\", \"computerName\": \"CORP123\", \"creator\": \"N/A\", \"deviceClass\": \"E0h\", \"deviceInformationServiceInfoKey\": \"\", \"deviceInformationServiceInfoValue\": \"\", \"deviceName\": \"\", \"eventId\": \"{1988659d-af84-11ec-914c-806e6f6e6963}\", \"eventTime\": \"2022-03-29T17:17:40.622+00:00\", \"eventType\": \"connected\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Group Default Group in Site CORP-Users of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-Users / Default Group\", \"gattService\": \"\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"interface\": \"USB\", \"lastLoggedInUserName\": \"user.name\", \"lmpVersion\": \"N/A\", \"manufacturerName\": \"\", \"minorClass\": \"N/A\", \"osType\": \"windows\", \"productId\": \"AAA\", \"profileUuids\": \"N/A\", \"ruleId\": -1, \"ruleName\": null, \"ruleScopeName\": null, \"ruleType\": \"productId\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteName\": \"CORP-Users\", \"uid\": \"\", \"vendorId\": \"8087\", \"version\": \"N/A\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1387019684138751044\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"USB device was connected on CORP123.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-29T17:20:30.998054Z\", \"userId\": null}", "Group Default Group in Site CORP-Users of Account CORP", "Global / CORP / CORP-Users / Default Group", "{\"accountId\": \"551799238352448315\", \"activityType\": 5232, \"agentId\": \"840949586976454071\", \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-14T11:30:19.543892Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"action\": \"Block\", \"application\": null, \"applicationType\": \"any\", \"computerName\": \"CORP1234\", \"createdByUsername\": \"CUS_TER_211022_09_10_03_c4b7bce44eaf5d749e0399dd34f70ab83e3a1fd7\", \"direction\": \"inbound\", \"durationOfMeasurement\": 60, \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Group Default Group in Site CORP-workstations of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-workstations / Default Group\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"localHost\": null, \"localHostType\": \"any\", \"localPortType\": \"any\", \"localPorts\": \"\", \"locationNames\": [], \"numberOfEvents\": 3, \"order\": 32, \"osTypes\": [\"windows\"], \"processId\": 4, \"processName\": \"\", \"protocol\": \"\", \"remoteHost\": null, \"remoteHostType\": \"any\", \"remotePortType\": \"any\", \"remotePorts\": \"\", \"reportedDirection\": \"inbound\", \"reportedLocalHost\": null, \"reportedLocalPort\": \"\", \"reportedProtocol\": \"\", \"reportedRemoteHost\": \"1.1.1.1\", \"reportedRemotePort\": \"\", \"ruleDescription\": \"Flux\", \"ruleId\": 556166862007673241, \"ruleName\": \"Block all\", \"ruleScopeLevel\": \"site\", \"ruleScopeName\": \"CORP-workstations (CORP)\", \"siteName\": \"CORP-workstations\", \"status\": \"Enabled\", \"tagNames\": []}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": \"551799242261539645\", \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1398439837979472030\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"Firewall Control blocked traffic on the Endpoint CORP1234 because of rule Block all in site CORP-workstations (CORP).\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"551799242253151036\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-14T11:30:19.543894Z\", \"userId\": null}", "Firewall Control blocked traffic on the Endpoint CORP1234 because of rule Block all in site CORP-workstations (CORP). Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it. WebThe SentinelOne API is a RESTful API and is comprised of 300+ functions to enable 2-way integration with other security products. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others. Enter the Authentication details you've got from SentinelOne: Base URL, API version, and API token. Extract archive to your local development computer.\n2. Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird, Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects. Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts. A SentinelOne agent has remediated a threat. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool. ". Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups. Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data. 1.Log in to the SentinelOne Management Console with Admin user credentials. 99 - Admin\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"795516416264105067\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-11T07:18:34.089273Z\", \"userId\": \"827950513703271774\"}\n\n", "The Management user Jean DUPONT deleted the Path Exclusion C:\\Windows\\system32\\diskshadow.exe for Windows from the Group Env. Komenda na BH CS GO. Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. Detects persitence via netsh helper. Read user guides and learn about modules. SentinelOne (S1) features a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE actions. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020. Our goal at Scalyr is to provide sysadmins and DevOps engineers with a single log monitoring tool that replaces the hodgepodge of ", Google Workspace and Google Cloud Audit Logs, Skyhigh Security Secure Web Gateway (SWG), activites performed on SentinelOne infrastructure are logged. Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO. ", "Group Default Group in Site Sekoia.io of Account CORP", "{\"accountId\": \"551799238352448315\", \"activityType\": 120, \"agentId\": \"977351746870921161\", \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-11T06:49:21.769668Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"computerName\": \"CL002793\", \"disabledLevel\": null, \"enabledReason\": \"expired\", \"expiration\": null, \"externalIp\": \"88.127.242.225\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Group DSI in Site CORP-workstations of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-workstations / DSI\", \"groupName\": \"DSI\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"DSI\", \"siteName\": \"CORP-workstations\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": \"797501649544140679\", \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1396124097359316984\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The CL002793 Agent is enabled due to time expiration.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"551799242253151036\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-11T06:49:21.765992Z\", \"userId\": null}\n\n", "The CL002793 Agent is enabled due to time expiration. Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade SentinelOne with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box. Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet. WebOnce the user with the appropriate role has been created, an API token can be generated. As a quick summary though you can reference the following notes: Copyright 2020-2023 David Schulte (Celerium). Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. A SentinelOne agent has been disabled according to SentinelOne logs. Note: A user with a role of "Site Admin" can mitigate threats from the SEKOIA.IO. SentinelOne Singularity XDR provides AI-powered prevention, detection, and response across user endpoints, cloud workloads, and IoT devices. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. For more information, see Resources for creating Microsoft Sentinel custom connectors. Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. ", "Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Success", "/threats/mitigation-report/1391846354842495401", "{\"accountId\": \"551799238352448315\", \"activityType\": 25, \"agentId\": null, \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-14T06:19:49.402205Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"byUser\": \"Jean Dupont\", \"deactivationPeriodInDays\": \"90\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Site CORP-servers-windows of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-servers-windows\", \"groupName\": null, \"role\": \"Contr\\u00f4le Interne\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Site\", \"scopeName\": \"CORP-servers-windows\", \"siteName\": \"CORP-servers-windows\", \"userScope\": \"site\", \"username\": \"Foo User\"}, \"description\": \"Jean Dupont\", \"groupId\": null, \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1398283556850059260\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The management user Jean Dupont deleted the user Foo User.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"795516416264105067\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-14T06:19:49.402210Z\", \"userId\": \"1157751223520522706\"}", "The management user Jean Dupont deleted the user Foo User. A user with a role of "Site Viewer" can view threats but cannot take action. This gives system administrators and PowerShell developers a convenient and familiar way of using SentinelOnes API to create documentation scripts, automation, and integrations. This gives me confidence that everything I see on the screen can be done programmatically. ", "This binary may contain encrypted or compressed data as measured by high entropy of the sections (greater than 6.8). Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat but did not mitigate it. Click Save We create the integration and it When a threat is detected in SentinelOne, SentinelOne StorylineTM correlates detections and activity data across security layers, including email, endpoints, mobile, and cloud. Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive. The API token you generate is time limited. Scroll until you see the SentinelOne integration and click Install to open This enrichment queries the CrowdStrike Device API for an IP address and returns host information. Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. 01 - Prod in Site corp-servers-windows of Account corp\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / corp / corp-servers-windows / Env. kubernetes, nomad or cloudfoundry). The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell. For better performance and lower costs choose the same [region](https://azure.microsoft.com/regions/) where Microsoft Sentinel is located.\n\n6. A SentinelOne agent has failed to quarantine a threat. Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion. ", "fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f709,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f708,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f707", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe", "25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba", "\"C:\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe\"", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "Suspicious library loaded into the process memory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531", "fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "{\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"activityType\": 27, \"agentId\": null, \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.018328Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP\", \"groupName\": null, \"ipAddress\": \"11.22.33.44\", \"reason\": null, \"role\": \"Admin\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Account\", \"scopeName\": \"CORP\", \"siteName\": null, \"source\": \"mgmt\", \"userScope\": \"account\", \"username\": \"Jean DUPONT\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": null, \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1388919233083515416\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": null, \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.013748Z\", \"userId\": \"111111111111111111\"}", "The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44. 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